Event-driven programming (EDP) is the prevalent paradigm for graphical user interfaces, web clients, and it is rapidly gaining importance for server-side and network programming. Central components of EDP are event loops, which act as FIFO queues that are used by processes to store and dispatch messages received from other processes.
Introduction
Event-driven programming (EDP) consists of defining responses to events such as user actions, I/O signals, or messages from other programs. EDP is the prevalent paradigm in graphical user interfaces, web clients, and it is rapidly gaining importance for server-side and network programming. For instance, the HTML5 standard [2] mandates that user agents be implemented using EDP, similarly, Node.js, memcached, and Nginx, also rely on EDP.
In EDP, each program has an event loop which consists of a FIFO queue and a control process (or thread) that listens to events. Events that arrive are pushed into the queue and are sequentially dispatched by the control process according to the FIFO policy. A key feature of EDP is that high-latency (or blocking) operations, such as database or network requests, can be handled asynchronously: They appear in the queue only as events signaling start and completion, whereas the blocking operation itself is handled elsewhere. In this way EDP achieves the responsiveness and fine-grained concurrency required for modern user interfaces and network servers, without burdening programmers with explicit concurrency control. Figure 1 : Shared event loop. A enqueues multiple short tasks and records the time at which each of them is processed. The time difference between two consecutive tasks reveals whether V has posted tasks in-between, and how long they took to execute.
In this paper we show that EDP-based systems are susceptible to side-channel attacks. The key observation is that event loops form a resource that can be shared between mutually distrusting programs. Hence, contention of this resource by one program can be observed by the others through variations in the time the control process takes for dispatching their events. Figure 1 illustrates such a scenario for a loop that is shared between an attacker A and a victim V .
Attacks based on observable contention of shared resources have a long history [23] and an active present [8, 25, 33] ; however, attacks against shared event loops have so far only been considered from a theoretical point of view [20] . Here, we perform the first attacks against real EDP-based systems. Specifically, we target shared event loops in the two central processes of Google's Chrome web browser: The host process, whose event loops are shared between all requests for common resources, such as network and user interface; and the renderer processes, whose loops can be shared between Javascript tasks of different tabs or iframes.
We build infrastructure that enables us to spy on both loops from a malicious HTML page. This is facilitated by the asynchronous programming model used in both Chrome and Javascript. Asynchronous function calls trigger new tasks that are appended into the same queue, in contrast to synchronous calls which are simply pushed onto the current task's call stack and executed without preemption, blocking the loop.
• For the event loop of the renderer we rely on the postMessage API, which is a Javascript feature providing asynchronous callbacks. This allow us to perform monitoring with a resolution of 25 µs, with only one task in the loop at each point in time. • For the event loop of the host process we rely on two different mechanisms: network requests to non-routable IP addresses, which enter the loop and abort very quickly, enable monitoring with a resolution of 500 µs; and SharedWorkers, whose messages pass through the event loop of the host process, providing a resolution of 100 µs.
We use the information obtained using these techniques in three different attacks:
1. We show how event delays during the loading phase, corresponding to resource requests, parsing, Javascript execution and rendering, can be used to uniquely identify a web page. Figure 2 visualizes this effect using three representative web pages. While this attack shares the goal with the Memento attack [19] , the channels are quite different: First, in contrast to Memento, we find that the relative ordering of events is necessary for successful classification, which motivates the use of dynamic time warping as a distance metric. Second, we show that page identification through the event loop requires only minimal training: we achieve a 75% and 30% of recognition rates on each event loop, respectively, for 500 main pages from Alexa's Top sites using only a single sample of each page for the training phase. Figure 2 : Delays observed by an attacker tab running concurrently, in the same renderer process, with different web pages while they loading. Horizontal axis depicts elapsed real time, vertical axis depicts time taken by the event loop for processing the tasks inserted by the attacker. All pages are clearly distinguishable, both by the human eye and by classification techniques.
2. We illustrate how user actions in cross-origin pages can be detected based on the delays introduced in the event loop. In particular, we mount an attack against Google OAuth login forms, where we are able to extract the inter-keystroke timing information from a user's password (while he is typing). The timing measurements we obtain are significantly less noisy than those obtained from network traffic [18] . The two consecutive delays of approx 1ms each correspond to keydown and keypress events.
3. We demonstrate that shared event loops can be used to transmit information between cross-origin pages, see Figure 4 . Specifically, we implement a covert channel with a bandwidth of 200 bit/s through the renderer's main thread event loop, and another one working cross-processes of 5 bit/s. Our attacks show that event loops can be successfully spied on even with simple means. They work under the assumption that event loops behave as FIFO queues; in reality, however, Chrome's event loop has a more sophisticated structure, relying on multiple queues and a policy-based scheduler. We believe that this structure can be leveraged for much more powerful attacks in the future.
In summary, we demonstrate that shared event loops in Google's Chrome web browser are susceptible to timing side-channel attacks that can diminish user privacy and violate the confidentiality of the SOP.
Isolation Policies and Sharing of Event Loops in Chrome
In this section we revisit the same origin policy and its variants. We then discuss the relationship of these policies with the Chrome architecture, where we put a special focus on the way in which event loops are shared.
Same Origin Policy
The Same-Origin Policy (SOP) is a central concept in the web security model: The policy restricts scripts on a web page to access data from another page if their origins differ. Two pages have the same origin if protocol, port and host are equal. The demand for flexible cross-origin communication has triggered the introduction of features such as domain relaxation, the postMessage API, Crossorigin Resource Sharing (CORS), Channel Messaging, Suborigins, or the Fetch API. This feature creep comes with increased browser complexity and attack surface and has motivated browser vendors to move towards more robust multi-process architectures.
Overview of the Chrome Architecture
The Chrome architecture is segmented into different operating system processes. The rationale for this segmentation is twofold: to isolate web content from the host [6] , and to support the enforcement of same origin policies by means of the OS [27] . For achieving this segmentation, Chrome relies on two processes:
The host process runs the top-level browser window. It has access to system resources such as network, file systems, UI events, etc., which it manages on behalf of the unprivileged renderer processes. The host process runs several threads; the most relevant ones are:
• the CrBrowserMain thread, which handles, e.g., user interaction events, and • the IOThread, which handles, e.g., IPC, network stack, and file system.
The renderer processes are sandboxed processes responsible for parsing, rendering and Javascript execution. Communication with the host processes is done via an inter-process communication (IPC) system based on message passing. Each renderer runs several threads; the most relevant ones are:
• the MainThread where resource parsing, style calculation, layout, painting and non-worker Javascript runs, • the IOChildThread, which handles IPC communication with the host process, and • the CompositorThread, which improves responsiveness during the rendering phase by allowing the user to scroll and see animations while the main thread is busy, thanks to a snapshot of the page's state. Each of the threads in the host and renderers processes maintains at least one event loop that is largely a FIFO queue. Inter-thread and inter-process communication are carried out via message passing through these queues. We next discuss scenarios where pages of different origin can share the event loops of host and renderer processes. In Section 3 we show how this sharing can be exploited for eavesdropping.
Sharing in the Renderer Processes
Chrome supports different policies that govern how web applications are mapped into renderer processes, and that influence the extent to which event loops are shared.
The default policy is called process-per-siteinstance.
It creates a dedicated renderer process for each instance of a site.
Here, a site is defined as a registered domain plus a scheme. For example, https://docs.google.com and https://mail.google.com:8080 are from the same site -but not from the same origin, as they differ in subdomain and port. A site instance is a collection of pages from the same site that can obtain references to each other (e.g., one page opened the other in a new window using Javascript).
The other supported policies are more permissive. For example, the process-per-site policy groups all instances of a site in the same renderer process, trading robustness for a lower memory overhead. The process-per-tab policy dedicates one renderer process to each group of script-connected tabs. Finally, the single-process policy lets both the host and renderer run within a single OS process (only used for debugging purposes).
Even in the restrictive default process-per-instance policy, there are some situations that force Chrome to host documents from different sites in the same renderer process, causing them to share the event loop:
• Iframes are currently hosted in the same process as their parent. • Renderer-initiated navigations such as link clicks, form submissions, and scripted redirections will reuse the same renderer. • When the number of renderer processes exceeds a certain threshold, Chrome starts to reuse existing renderers instead of creating new ones 1 .
The threshold for reuse of renderers is calculated by splitting half of the physical RAM between them, under the assumption that each renderer consumes 60MB (on a 64-bit architecture). In our experiments on a machine with 4 GB of RAM, we could spawn 31 new tabs before any renderer was shared, whereas with a machine with 8 GB of RAM, we observed a threshold of approximately 70 renderers. There is no grouping policy for the pages that can share a process when this threshold is exceed. We do not observe any preference for similar origins, same sites, or secure versus insecure pages. In fact, even filesystem pages (loaded with file://) can co-reside with an arbitrary HTTP site. The only exception is that tabs in Incognito mode are not mixed up with "normal" tabs.
Sharing in the Host Process
The Chrome sandbox restricts access of renderers to privileged actions. That is, renderers have to communicate with the host process for network requests or user input. The corresponding messages of all renderers pass through the event loop of the host process' I/O thread. We illustrate this communication using two different examples: how user actions flow from the host to the corresponding renderer process, and conversely, how network requests flow from a renderer to the host process.
• UI flow: User actions such as mouse movements or clicks enter the browser through the main thread of the host process. The main thread communicates with the corresponding renderer by message passing between their I/O event loops, and the render acknowledges the receipt of this message. Even events with no Javascript listeners occupy the event loop of the renderer's main thread for a measurable interval. • Net stack: Chrome's net stack is a complex crossplatform network abstraction. Any network request by a renderer is passed to the I/O thread of the host process, which forwards it to a global resource dispatcher that will pass it to a worker to idle processes.
fulfill the request. This worker will open a connection, if necessary, and request the resource. After the request is done, the response headers are received and sent back to the renderer process, which will respond with an ACK after reading, Finally, the body is received and potential callbacks are triggered.
Eavesdropping on Event Loops in Chrome
In this section we describe how to violate the SOP by eavesdropping on the event loops of Chrome's host and renderer processes. For each of these processes, we describe potential threat scenarios and present a simple HTML page executing Javascript that can be used for spying. We then present our monitoring tool to visualize the event loops of the browser.
The Renderer Process Event Loop

Threat Scenarios
We describe several cases of real life threats where an adversary site A shares the event loop of the renderer's main thread with a victim site V . These scenarios are based on Chrome's policy for mapping sites to renderers, as described in Section 2.3.
• Malicious advertisement. In this scenario, A runs as an advertisement iframed in V . A's iframe is able to execute Javascript on V 's event loop, enabling it to gather information about user behavior in V .
• Keylogger. In this scenario, A pops up a login form to authenticate its users via V 's OAuth. Because the operation does not ask for special privileges, the victim could trust it and fill the form. Meanwhile, A's page monitors keystroke timings (see Section 4.2), which can be used for recovering user passwords [28] . • Tab popup. In this scenario, the victim clicks anywhere on a page from A. This enables A to open a new tab (bypassing the popup blocker) sharing the renderer process with an arbitrary site V , and therefore its event loop. This could
self . postMessage (0 , '* ') 4 } 5 self . onmessage = loop 6 self . postMessage (0 , '* ') Listing 1: Javascript code to monitor the main thread's event loop with the postMessage API. be used to detect the user's state in the site, for instance, to find out if he is logged or not.
Monitoring Techniques
To monitor the renderer's event loop it is sufficient to continuously post asynchronous tasks and measure the time interval between subsequent pairs of events. The most common way of posting asynchronous tasks programmatically in Javascript is setTimeout. However its delay can be longer than 1000 ms for inactive tabs, rendering it useless for the purpose of spying. Instead, we use the postMessage API for sending asynchronous messages to ourselves.
The code in Listing 1 shows how this is achieved. The call to performance.now() in line 2 of the function loop returns a high-resolution timestamp that is saved as described below. The call to self.postmessage(0,'*') in line 3 posts message "0" into the renderer's event loop, where the second argument "*" indicates no restriction on the receiver's origin. Line 5 registers loop as an event listener, which enables it to receive the messages it has posted. This causes loop to recursively post tasks into the loop, while keeping the render responsive since other events are still being processed.
In order to minimize the noise introduced by the measurement script itself, the function save in line 2 uses a pre-allocated typed array (Float64Array) to store all the timing measurements. Contrary to normal Javascript's sparse arrays, typed arrays avoid memory reallocations and thus noisy garbage collection rounds, see below. With that we achieve an average delay between two consecutive tasks near 25 µs (in our machine). This resolution is sufficient to iden-tify even short events. For example, a single mouse movement event (without explicit event handler) consumes around 100 µs.
Interferences
In modern browsers there are several sources of noise that affect measurement precision, beside the obvious effect of the underlying hardware platform and OS. They include:
• Just-in-time compilation (JIT). JIT can trigger code optimization or deoptimization, in the case of Chrome by the CrankShaft and Turbofan compilers, at points in time that are hard to predict. For our measurements we rely on a warm-up phase of about 150 ms to obtain fully optimized code. • Garbage collection (GC). In the case of V8, GC includes small collections (so-called scavenges) and major collections. Scavenges are periodical and fast (< 1 ms); but major collections may take > 100 ms, distributed into incremental steps. In our data, scavenges are easily identifiable due to their periodicity, while major collections could be spotted due to their characteristic size. On some browsers, such as Microsoft's Internet Explorer, GC rounds can be triggered programmatically, which helps to eliminate noise from the measurements enabling more precise attacks [11] .
While all of these effects affect the effectiveness of our attacks, it is interesting to think of them as potential side-channels by themselves. For example, observable GC and JIT events can reveal information about a program's memory and code usage patterns, respectively.
The Host Process Event Loop
Threat Scenarios
As explained in Section 2.4, the Chrome sandbox ensures that all of the renderer's network and user interaction events pass through the host process' I/O event loop. We describe two threat scenarios where this could be exploited.
• Covert channel. Pages of different origins running in different (disconnected) tabs can use the shared event loop to implement a covert channel, violating the browser's isolation mechanisms. This will work even if one (or both) pages run in incognito mode. • Fingerprinting. A tab running a rogue page of A can identify which pages are being visited by the user in other tabs by spying on the shared event loop. Detecting the start of a navigation is facilitated by the fact that the I/O thread blocks for a moment when the user types in a URL and presses enter.
Monitoring Techniques
There are many ways to post asynchronous tasks into the event loop; they differ in terms of the resolution with which they enable monitoring the event loop and the overhead they imply. Below we describe two of the techniques we used.
Network Stack. The first technique is to use network requests to systematically monitor the event loop of the I/O thread of the host process. A valid request may take seconds to complete, with only the start and end operations visible in the loop, which is insufficient for monitoring purposes. Instead, we make use of non-routable IP addresses. The corresponding requests enter the I/O thread's event loop, are identified as invalid within the browser, and trigger the callback without any DNS resolution or socket creation. This mechanism provides a monitoring resolution of 500 µs, and has the additional benefit of being independent from network noise.
Listing 2 shows the code of our monitoring procedure. We rely on the Javascript Fetch API for posting the network requests. The Fetch API provides an interface for fetching resources using promises, which are ideal to manage asynchronous computations thanks to their simple syntax for handling callbacks. In line 2 we request and save a high-resolution timestamp. In line 3 we request a non-routable IP address, and set the rejection callback of the promise to self, to recursively run when the request fails.
Listing 2: Javascript code to monitor the host's I/O thread using network requests.
Shared Workers. The second technique relies on web workers, which is a mechanism for executing Javascript in the background. Web workers that are shared between multiple pages are usually implemented in a dedicated OS process; this means they communicate via IPC and, therefore, can be used to spy on the I/O thread of the host process. This mechanism provides a monitoring resolution of 100 µs.
Listing 3 shows the code of our worker-based monitoring procedure. The first snippet defines the worker's job, which consists in to reply to each message received. In the second snippet: Line 1 registers the worker; Lines 2-7 record a timestamp and recursively send messages to the worker, analogous to Listing 1. As a result, we measure the round trip time from the page to the worker, which reflects the congestion in the I/O event loop.
Interferences
There are many different sources of noise and uncertainty in the I/O thread of the host process. The most notable ones include the interleaving with the host's main thread and the messages from other renderers, but also the GPU process and browser plugins. While these interferences could potentially be exploited as side channels, the noise becomes quickly prohibitive as the loop gets crowded.
The LoopScan Tool
We implement the eavesdropping techniques described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 in a tool called Loop-Scan, which enables us to explore the characteristics Note that LoopScan's functionality is in principle covered by the powerful Chrome Trace Event Profiling Tool (about:tracing) [3] , which provides detailed flame graphs for all processes and threads. However, LoopScan has the advantage of delivering more accurate timing information about event-delay traces than the profiler, since loading a page with the Trace Event Profiling tool severely distorts the measurements. We will make LoopScan publicly available with this paper.
Attacks
In this section we systematically analyze the side channel caused by sharing event loops in three kinds of attacks: a page identification attack, an attack where we eavesdrop on user actions, and a covert channel attack. For all attacks we spy on the event loops of the renderer and the host processes, as described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
Page identification
We describe how the event-delay trace obtained from spying on event loops can be used for identifying webpages loaded in other tabs. We begin by explaining our data selection and harvesting process and the chosen analysis methods, before we describe our experimental setup and the results we obtain.
Sample Selection
We start with the list of Alexa Top 1000 sites, from which we remove duplicates. Here, duplicates are sites that share the subdomain but not the top-level domains (e.g., "google.br" and "google.com") and that are likely to have similar event-delay traces. From the remaining list, we randomly select 500 sites as our sample set. This reduction facilitates a rigorous exploration of the data and the parameter space.
Data Harvesting
We visit each page in the sample set 30 times for both the renderer and the host process, to record traces of event-delays during the loading phase.
The event-delay traces for the renderer process consist of 200.000 data items each. On our testing machine, the measurement resolution (i.e. the delay between two subsequent measurement events on an otherwise empty loop) lies at approximately 25 µs. That is, each trace captures around 5 seconds (200.000·25 µs = 5 s) of the loading process of a page in the sample set. 2 The event-delay traces for the host process consist of 100.000 data items each. The measurement resolution lies in the range of 80 − 100 µs, i.e. each trace captures around 9 s of the loading process of a page.
We automate the harvesting procedure for the renderer process as follows: The harvesting procedure for the host process differs only in that we use the rel="noopener" attribute in order to spawn a new renderer.
We conducted all measurements on 2 different machines, (1) a Debian 8.6 with a kernel 3.16.0-4-amd64, running on a Intel i5 @ 3.30GHz x 4 with 4 GB of RAM, and Chromium v53.0.2785.143; and (2) an OSX running on a Macbook Pro 5.5 with Intel Core 2 Duo @ 2.53GHz with 4 GB of RAM, and Chrome v54.0.2840.87. For each machine and event loop, we measured the timing on a Chrome instance with two tabs, one for the spy process and the other for the target page.
Overall, we thus obtain four corpora of 15.000 traces each, for the renderer and host processes on both machines.
Classification
Event Delay Histograms Our first approach is to cluster the observed event delays around k centers, and to transform each trace into a histogram that represents the number of events that fall into each of the k classes. We then use the Euclidean distance as a metric on the k-dimensional signatures.
This approach is inspired by the notion of memprints in [19] . It appears to be suitable for classifying event-delay traces obtained from event loops because, for example, static pages with few external resources are more likely to produce long events at the beginning and stabilize soon, whereas pages with Javascript resources and animations are likely to lead to more irregular patterns and produce a larger number of long delays. Unfortunately, our experimental results were discouraging, with less than a 15% of recognition rate in small data sets. Figure 6 : Warping matrix. The warping path in the upper right square represents the optimal alignment between points in the time series corresponding to 'google.com' (horizontal axis) with points in the time series of 'youtube.com' (vertical axis).
Dynamic Time Warping
Our second approach is to maintain temporal information about the observed events. The relative ordering of events is a promising feature for page identification, since the exact points in time at which the events occur are prone to environmental noise. For example, network delays will influence the duration of network requests.
This motivates the use of dynamic time warping (DTW) [7] as a similarity measure on event-delay traces. DTW is widely used for classifying time series, i.e., sequences of data points taken at successive and equally spaced points in time. DTW represents a notion of distance that considers as "close" timedependent data of similar shape but different speed, i.e., DTW is robust to horizontal compressions and stretches. This is useful, for example, when one is willing to assign a low distance score to signals corresponding to "abc" and "abbbbc', insensitive to the prolonged duration of "b". Formally, DTW compares two time series: a query, X = (x 1 , ..., x n ); and a reference, Y = (y 1 , ..., y m ). For that we use a non-negative distance function f (x i , y i ) defined between any pair of elements x i and y j . The goal of DTW is to find a matching of points in X with points in Y , such that (1) every point is matched, (2) the relative ordering of points in each sequence is preserved (monotonicity), (3) and the cummulative distance (i.e. the sum of the values of f ) over all matching points is minimized. This matching is called a warping path, and the corresponding distance is the time warping distance d(X, Y ). Figure 6 ) visualizes a warping path between the time series corresponding to event-delay traces observed while loading different webpages.
Speed-up Techniques
Unfortunately, the time required for computing d(X, Y ) is quadratic in the length of the input sequences and does not scale up to the raw data obtained in our measurements. We rely on two kinds of speed-up techniques, one at the level of the data and the other at the level of the algorithm:
At the level of data, we reduce the dimension of our data by applying a basic sampling algorithm: We split the raw trace into groups of measurements corresponding to time intervals of length P, and replace each of those groups by one representative. This representative can be computed by summing over the group, or by taking its average, maximum or minimum. Sampling reduces the size of the traces by a factor of P/t, where t is the average duration of an event delay. Figure 7 shows two plots with the raw data taken from a renderer's main thread loop, and its corresponding time series obtained after sampling.
At the algorithmic level, We use two sets of techniques for pruning the search for the optimal warping path, namely windowing and step patterns.
• Windowing is a heuristic that enforces a global constraint on the envelope of the warping path. It speeds up DTW but will not find optimal warping paths that lie outside of the envelope. Two wellestablished constraint regions are the Sakoe-Chiba band and the Itakura parallelogram, see Figure 8 .
•
Step patterns are a heuristic that puts a local constraint on search for a warping path, in terms of restrictions on its slope. In particular, we rely on three well-known step patterns available in R. Intuitively, the first pattern (symmetric1) favors progress close to the diagonal, the second (symmetric2) allows for arbitrary compressions and expansions, and the third (asymmetric) forces each point in the reference to be used only once.
Parameter tuning
The possible configurations of the techniques presented in Section 4.1.4 create a large parameter space. We systematically identify the best parameter configuration for both event loops on each machine (Linux vs OSX-based). To this end, we divide our dataset of 30 traces (per page, loop, and machine), into 15 traces for tuning and 15 for cross-validation. In Figure 9 we present an extract from the tuning phase for the renderer process of the Linux machine. The details of the parameter tuning can be found in Appendix B; we next discuss the results of the crossvalidation. 
Experimental Results
We evaluate the performance of page identification through the shared event loops of the renderer and host processes, on two different machines.
To this end, we select the top configuration for each corpus from the tuning phase and carry out a 10-fold cross-validation. In each of the 10 rounds, we select a training set that contains one trace of each page, and a testing set that contains three different traces of each page. For each of the traces in the testing set, we compute the set of k closest matches in the training set according to the time warping distance.
We measure performance in terms of the k-match rate, which is the percentage of pages in the testing set for which the true match is within the set of k closest matches. We abbreviate the 1-match rate by recognition rate, i.e. the percentage of pages where the best match is the correct one. The result of the cross-validation is the average k-match rate over all 10 rounds. Table 1 summarizes our experiments. We highlight the following results
• We can correctly identify a page by spying on the renderer in 76.7% of the cases, and correctly narrow down to a set of 10 candidates in 91.1% of the cases.
• We can correctly identify a page though the host process in 31.4%, and narrow down to a set of 10 candidates in up to 59.1% of the cases.
• We stress that these recognition rates are obtained using a single trace for training. Table 1 : 10-fold cross-validation results on different machines and different event loops, with the best configuration after tuning.
• Recognition is easier through the renderer than through the host. This is explained by the difference in noise and measurement resolution, see Section 3.2.3. Furthermore, most operations on the host only block the I/O thread while signaling their start and completion, whereas the renderer is blocked during the entire execution of each Javascript task.
• We observe higher recognition rates on Linux than on Mac. However the homogeneity in hardware and software of Macbooks facilitate reuse of training data across machines, which may make remote page identification feasible.
Threats to Validity
We perform our experiments in a closed-world scenario with only 2 tabs (the spy and the victim) sharing an event loop. In real world scenarios there can be more pages concurrently running the browser, which will make detection harder. On the other hand, our attacks do not make any use of the pages' source code or of details of Chrome's scheduling system with priority queues, the GC with periodic scavenges, or the frame rendering tasks. We believe that taking into account this information can significantly improve an adversary's eavesdropping capabilities and enable attacks even in noisy, open-world scenarios. 
Detecting User Behavior
In this section we show that it is possible to detect user actions performed in a cross-origin tab or iframe, when the renderer process is shared. We first describe an attack recovering the inter-keystroke timing information against Google's OAuth login forms, that provides higher precision than existing network-based attacks [28] . In Appendix 3.3 we give evidence that mouse movements and mouse clicks can be identified in a similar fashion.
Inter-keystroke Timing Attack on Google's OAuth login form
Many web applications use the OAuth protocol for user authentication. OAuth allows users to login using their identity with trusted providers, such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, or Github. On the browser, this process is commonly implemented as follows: 1. A web application A pops up the login form of a trusted provider T ; 2. User V types their (name and) password and submits the form to T ; 3. T generates an authorization token. Because the window of the login form shares the event loop with the opener's renderer, a malicious A can eavesdrop on the keystroke events issued by the login form. Figure 3 depicts the event-delay trace of a keystroke as seen by an eavesdropper on the ren-
Listing 4: Javascript code to detect keystrokes in a trace of timestamps gathered by the code in Figure 1 . We classify a timestamp as a keystroke if the differences to the previous and subsequent timestamps (d1 and d2) are both in a predefined range.
derer's event loop. The trace contains two characteristic consecutive delays, caused by the keydown and keypress event handlers. We use this observation to identify keystrokes, by scanning the event-delay trace for pairs of consecutive delays that are within a predefined range, forgoing any training or offline work. Listing 4 contains the script that performs this operation. We define 0.4ms as a lower bound, and 3.0ms as an upper bound for the range. We chose this threshold before gathering the data, by inspection of a single keystroke event.
Experimental Evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness of this attack, we have implemented a malicious application A that extracts the inter-keystroke timing information from a user V logging-in via Google's OAuth. The focus of our evaluation is to determine the accuracy with which keystroke timings can be measured through the event loop. A full keystroke recovery attack is out of scope of this paper; for this refer to [28] .
We simulate an inter-keystroke timing attack in 4 steps, which are described below and illustrated in Figure 10 .
1. A Selenium 4 script acting as V navigates to A, clicks on the login button (which pops up Google's OAuth login form), types a password, and submits the form. 2. Meanwhile, the attacker A monitors the main thread's event loop using the attack described in Section 4.2.1. 3. V and A send to the server the timestamps of the real and the detected keystrokes, respectively. 4. We compute the accuracy of the detected keystrokes, where we take the timestamps of the real keystrokes as ground truth. Matching the timestamps requires taking into account the delay (6−12 ms on our machine) between Selenium triggering an event, and Chrome receiving it. We use as inter-keystroke timings random delays uniformly drawn from 100-300ms. This choice is inspired by [18] , who report on a mean interkeystroke delay of 208ms. Using random delays is sufficient for evaluating the accuracy of eavesdropping on keystrokes, but it obviously does not reveal any information about the password besides its length.
Experimental Results
We perform experiments with 10.000 passwords extracted from the RockYou dataset, where we obtain the following results: • In 91.5% of the cases, our attack correctly identifies the length of a password. 5 In 2.2% of the cases, the attack misses one or more characters, and in 6.3% of the cases it reports spurious characters.
• For the passwords whose length was correctly identified, the average time difference between a true keystroke and a detected keystroke event is 6.3ms, which we attribute mostly to the influence of Selenium. This influence cancels out when we compute the mean difference between a true inter-keystroke delay and a detected interkeystroke delay, which amounts to 1.4ms. The noise of these measurements is low: We observe a standard deviation of 6.1ms, whereas the authors of [18] report on 48.1ms for their network based measurements.
Challenges for Cross-renderer Recognition and Automation
We have focused on detecting keystroke timings in the event loop of the renderer. However, we have seen that all these events originate in the main thread of the host process and are sent towards a specific renderer through the I/O thread of the host process (blocking the loop). Hence, any user action can in principle be detected by spying on the I/O thread's event loop. Unfortunately, our current resolution is not enough for reliable detection, since that thread is much more noisy than the renderer's main thread.
As ongoing work we are addressing the problem of automatically detecting user actions. For this, we are developing techniques for training classifiers to distinguish between different event handlers, in order to recognize them in arbitrary event-delay traces.
Covert Channel
In this section we show how shared event loops in Chrome can be abused for implementing covert channels, i.e. channels for illicit communication across origins. We first consider the case of cross-origin pages sharing the event loop of a renderer's main thread before we turn to the case of cross-origin pages sharing the event loop of the host processes' I/O thread.
Renderer Process
We implement a communication channel to transmit messages from a sender page S to a cross-origin receiver page R running in the same renderer process.
For this, we use a simple, unidirectional transmission scheme without error correction. Specifically, we encode each bit using a time interval of fixed duration t b . The optimal configuration of t b depends on the system. In our experiments we tried different values, with t b = 5 ms giving good results on different platforms: Chromium 52.0 on Debian 64-bit and Chrome 53 on OSX.
In each of those intervals we do the following:
• the sender S idles for transmitting a 0; it executes a blocking task of durationt < t b for transmitting a 1.
• the receiver R monitors the event loop of the renderer's main thread using the techniques described in Section 3.1; it decodes a 0 if the length of the observed tasks is below a threshold (related tot), and a 1 otherwise. Transmission starts with S sending a 1, which is used by the agents to synchronize their clocks and start counting time intervals. Transmission ends with S sending a null byte. With this basic scheme we achieve rates of 200 bit/s. These numbers can likely be significantly improved by using more sophisticated coding schemes with error correction mechanisms; here, we are only interested in the proof-of-concept.
We note that there are a number of alternative covert channels for transmitting information between pages running in the same renderer [1] , e.g., using window.name, location.hash, history.length, scrollbar's position or window.frames.length. What distinguishes the event-loop based channel is that it does not require the sender and receiver to be connected, i.e. they do not need to hold references to each other in order to communicate.
Host Process
We also implement a communication channel to transmit messages between two cooperative renderer processes sharing the host process. Transmission is unidirectional from sender S to receiver R. Figure 4 visualizes how this channel can be used, even if one of the parties browses in Incognito mode.
As before, we encode each bit using a time intervals of fixed duration t b . During each intervals we do the following:
• the sender S idles for transmitting a 0; it posts N fetch requests into the I/O thread's queue for sending a 1. • the receiver R monitors the event loop of the I/O thread of the host process using the techniques described in Section 3.2. It decodes a 0 if the number of observed events during time interval t b is below a threshold, and 1 otherwise. The optimal values of N and t b highly depend on the machine. In our experiments we achieve good results, working on different systems, with a t b = 200 ms and N = 350, which give us a 5 bit/s transmission rate. This rate is significantly lower than for communication using the renderer event loop, which is explained by the difference in noise and monitoring resolution of both channels, as discussed in Section 3.2.3.
The threat scenario of this covert channel is more relevant than the previous one for the renderer loop. For example it could be used for exfiltrating information from an attacked domain (on a tab executing malicious Javascript) without producing network noise.
Discussion
We have shown how sharing event loops leads to timing side-channels and presented different attacks on Chrome. In Nov 2016, we filed an issue to Chromium's bug tracker and updated it recently. The issue is currently under discussion. Below, we discuss how other platforms are or can be affected and list some possible countermeasures.
Beyond Chrome
We focus on Chrome in our analysis because it is the most widely used browser, and because it was the first one to implement a multi-process architecture. However, there are good reasons to expect similar side channels in other browsers, as they all follow the event-driven paradigm and rely on similar architectures. For example, Firefox implements a browser process and a content process but, unlike Chrome, the content process uses a different thread for each origin (each thread with its own separate message queue). Despite this, some preliminary tests with the latest versions of Firefox indicate that congestion on the event loops is also measurable across origins and tabs.
Countermeasures
The attacks presented in this paper rely on two capabilities of the adversary: (1) the ability to post tasks into the loop's queue with high frequency, and (2) the ability to accurately measure the corresponding time differences.
Rate
Limiting. An obvious approach to counter (1) is to impose a limit on the rate at which tasks can be posted into an event loop. Unfortunately, rate limiting implies penalties on performance, which is especially problematic for asynchronous code.
At the level of the renderer, one possibility is to rely on an accumulate and serve policy [20] . With this policy, the event loop accumulates all the incoming jobs in a buffer for a period T , and then process and serves all the accumulated jobs from party A, followed by all the jobs from V . This has the advantage of limiting the amount of information leaked while retaining high amortized throughput.
At the level of the host process, where resource fetching is one of the main performance concerns, setting any bound on the processing rate is not acceptable. Here, it seems more reasonable to monitor the IPC activity of all renderers and penalize or flag those who exhibit a bad or anomalous behavior, e.g., along the lines of [34] .
Reduce Clock
Resolution. An obvious approach to counter (2) is to limit the resolution of available clocks. This has already been proposed by browser vendors for mitigating other kinds timing channels, but these efforts are unlikely to succeed, as shown in [21] : Modern browsers have a considerable number of methods to measure time without any explicit clock. For instance, some recent exploits [15] use high-resolution timers build on top of SharedAr-rayBuffers. Kohlbrenner et al. [21] instead propose a new browser architecture based on "fuzzy time" ideas, that can be applied on web browsers to effectively degrade clock's resolution and reduces the bandwidth of all timing channels, including ours.
Full Isolation. As discussed in Section 2.2, Chrome's multi-process architecture tries to use a different renderer for different origins, except for some corner cases. The "Site Isolation Project" is an ongoing effort to ensure a complete process-per-siteinstance policy, that means: providing cross-process navigations, cross-process Javascript interactions and out-of-process iframes. All this without inducing too much overhead.
One open question is how to handle the system's process limit, namely which sites should have isolation preference, or which heuristic for process reutilization should be used. A recent proposal, "Iso-lateMe" [4], puts the developers in charge of requesting to be isolated from other web content (even if it does not provide a firm guarantee).
CPU Throttling. Chrome v55 implements a CPU throttling mechanisms for background tabs. This mechanism introduces a new API to limit how much CPU a background page is allowed to use and to throttle tasks when the limit is exceeded. This affects background tabs trying to spy on the renderer's main thread, but still allows spying from (and on) any iframe or popup, as well as spying on the host process using SharedWorkers. Interestingly, tabs with audio are always considered foreground.
Related Work
Timing attacks on web browsers date back to Felten and Schneider [13] , who use the browser cache to obtain information about a user's browsing history.
More recently, so-called cross-site timing attacks [10, 31] have exploited the fact that the browser attaches cookies to all requests, even when they are performed across origins. The presence or absence of these cookies can be determined by timing measurements, which reveals information about the user's state on arbitrary sites. A special case are cross-site search attacks [14] , which circumvent the same-origin policy to extract sensitive information, by measuring the time it takes for the browser to receive responses to search queries.
Other classes of browser-based timing attacks exploit timing differences in rendering operations [22, 29, 5] , or simply use the browser as an entry point for Javascript that exploits timing channels of underlying hardware, for example caches [24, 15] , DRAM buffers [16] , or CPU contention [9] .
Of those approaches, [9] is related to our work in that it identifies web pages across browser tabs, based on timing of Javascript and a classifier using dynamic time warping. However, because the attack relies on CPU contention as a channel, it requires putting heavy load on all cores for monitoring. In contrast, our attack exploits the browser's event loop as a channel, which can be monitored by enqueing one event at a time. This makes our attack stealthy and more independent of the execution platform.
To the best of our knowledge, we are first to mount side-channel attacks that exploit the event-driven architecture of web browsers. Our work is inspired by a proof-of-concept attack [32] that steals a secret from a cross-origin web application by using the singlethreadedness of Javascript. We identify Chrome's event-driven architecture as the root cause of this attack, and we show how this observation generalizes, in three different attacks against two different event loops in Chrome.
Finally, a central difference between classical site fingerprinting [26, 17, 30, 12] approaches and our page identification attack is the adversary model: First, our adversary only requires its page to be opened in the victim's browser. Second, instead of traffic patterns in the victim's network, our adversary observes only time delays in the event queues of the victim's browser. We believe that our preliminary results, with up to 76% of recognition rate using one single sample for training in a closed-world with 500 pages, can be significantly improved by developing domain-specific classification techniques.
Conclusions
In this paper we demonstrate that shared event loops in Chrome are vulnerable to side-channel attacks, where a spy process monitors the loop usage pattern of other processes by enqueueing tasks and measuring the time it takes for them to be dispatched. We systematically study how this channel can be used for different purposes, such as web page identification, user behavior detection, and covert communication.
A Appendix B Parameter Tuning for Page Identification
We want to find out the configuration offering a better performance. We define performance as the rate of correctly identified web pages given a set of traces, based on computing the DTW distance against all the elements of a reference database and returning the nearest one. For that, we evaluate the effect of many parameters. The complete list of parameters is shown in We divide our dataset, 30 traces for each page, into tuning and validation data, using 15 traces of each page for each set, and proceed to measure the recognition rate for each possible combination of parameters:
1. For each configuration we randomly choose a pair of reference and test data from the tuning dataset, 2. We query each trace in the testing subset against the reference database and count the amount of matches, 3. Repeat the procedure N times and return the average. Since the number of possible configurations was very high, we used N = 3. Refer to Figure 9 for an extract from the tuning phase for the renderer process of the Linux machine. This procedure was repeated for the two event loops and in both machines.
We learn several facts about these experiments. First, measuring the loading phase of a web page during 2 seconds is sufficient for recognition, and the gain in recognition from using longer traces is minimal. Second, even if the combination of using stepPattern = symmetric1 and windowType = sakoechiba provides better results than other configurations, the parameters with a major impact on the recognition rate are P and windowSize. This is not entirely surprising since these two parameters are the ones with a stronger effect on the computation time (dimension reduction and global envelope). In fact, using P = 1 in the renderer's case, provides a gain close to 5%, but the cost of a single round of tuning (250.000 DTW calculations) takes 12 hours. Third, using the asymmetric step condition seems to perform worse in general, this makes sense given that it is a step pattern with a stricter warping slope.
In choosing between the alternative ways for computing representatives for intervals of length P, we found that the SUM function generally yields the best results.
C Identifying Mouse Events
We also consider eavesdropping on mouse events, such as movements and clicks. To be independent of a specific website, we focus on events without registered event listeners, that is, user events that do not trigger any Javascript execution. We expect user events with specific listeners to be more easily detectable because their execution blocks the loop for more time. We obtain the ground truth about event sequences triggered by user actions and the correponding delays using the Chrome Trace Event Profiling Tool.
Movements Mouse movement events enter the browser through the main thread of the host process. They are passed on through the renderer's I/O and compositor threads to the renderer's main thread. There, they block the loop during the event handling operation, before sending back an ACK signaling that the event has been consumed. The empty event handling operation blocks the main thread loop for approx 0.20 ms.
A continuous mouse movement results in a sequence of mouse movement events, each of which carries information about the coordinates of the cursor's trajectory. These events are issued with an interevent delay of 8 ms, i.e. each move is reflected as several dozens of events. The specific duration of the events and their characteristic frequency makes mouse movements easy to spot. Figure 11 shows the output of the LoopScan tool when monitoring mouse movement. We highlight the mouse movement intervals in the minimap, where we can observe their particular periodicity, and also the peaks of 0.1 ms duration in the zoomed area, which are all of similar shape.
Clicks Mouse click events, corresponding to "up" or "down", also enter the browser through the host process and block the renderer's event loop during event handling. Figure 12 illustrates the effect of a mouse down event in the renderer's event loop. The empty event handling operation is reflected by the two consecutive delays of around 0.5 ms. Mouse clicks are harder to spot than mouse movements. First, they happen only at a single point in time; second, the corresponding flow of events varies depending on the context in which the event occurs. However, spotting mouse clicks is facilitated by two observations: First, mouse clicks will often produce two consecutive events "down" and "up" (often separated by more than 100 ms); second, clicks usually come between mouse movements, which are more easily identified, see above.
